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n his article on the history of the militia in Ontario, Mike 
O’Brien writes, “While the term ‘warlike’ hardly fits the Canadian 
self-image, military service was viewed by many Canadians in the 
early twentieth century as a vital part of male citizenship” (115). Indeed, 
it has often been said that the country had its true birth not in 1867 
but during the First World War, when it experienced its “baptism by 
fire” in such battles as Vimy Ridge.1 War has long been a major theme 
in Canada’s literature (see, for example, Buitenhuis, Novak, Baetz, and 
Vance), including in some of the earliest texts of Canadian speculative 
fiction. In the decades immediately after Confederation, a number of 
novels and short stories appeared portraying future Canadas at war.2 
The authors seemed to assume that Canada’s destiny would involve mili-
tary conflict, particularly due to the belligerent behaviour of the great 
powers around it. Analyzing three of these texts — W.H.C. Lawrence’s 
The Storm of ’92 (1889), Ralph Centennius’s “The Dominion in 1983” 
(1883), and Ulric Barthe’s Similia similibus (1916) — provides insights 
into how war was seen as an inevitable part of Canada’s heritage and 
national development.3 Furthermore, it becomes clear that these texts 
were not merely reflecting assumptions about war, nor were they intend-
ed to be predictive; they were part of a broader effort among authors to 
further a nationalist agenda.
To understand the presence and role of war in Canada’s early specu-
lative fiction, it is necessary to review the meaning of war in late nine-
teenth-century European and North American culture, and also to see 
how Canadian literary depictions of imaginary wars fit into their generic 
context. The period from 1871 to the First World War was the heyday 
of what I.F. Clarke calls “future-war fiction,” a subgenre of speculative 
fiction that served a number of political and social as well as literary 
purposes, and the Canadian texts were part of that trend.
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War and Nationalism
Scholars of nationalism and war studies have analyzed how war has 
been seen as a nation-building exercise. Anthony D. Smith and John 
Hutchinson, for example, have studied the role of institutionalized war 
as a means of promoting nationalist sentiment. In “War and Ethnicity,” 
Smith argues that while other factors are necessary preconditions for the 
presence of national feeling, “war has been a powerful factor in shap-
ing . . . certain crucial aspects of ethnic community and nationhood” 
(375). Hutchinson is particularly interested in the role of official war 
commemoration rituals and monuments; as he writes in Nations as Zones 
of Conflict, “the people and its blood sacrifices became the object of wor-
ship,” leading to the myth of the fallen soldier, “the romantic mystique 
of a national hero, willing to sacrifice himself for the nation” (70). For 
John Gillis, commemoration of past wars and their “heroes” is less a 
spontaneous expression of popular feeling than “a political process” by 
which elites inculcate nationalism in their populations (“Warfare” 48). 
According to John A. Hall and Siniša Malešević, nationalism contrib-
utes to the conduct of war, while war contributes to national feeling; 
they quote Charles Tilley as saying, “‘states make war, and war makes 
states’” (11; see also Neiberg 49). Wars, they argue, have been “crucial 
for nationalism as their tragic experience creates shared collective mean-
ings that bind diverse citizenry into a single nation” (5).
During the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, many 
political thinkers saw war as a necessary and even positive institution. 
In Peace and War, Kalevi J. Holsti, for example, discusses the late nine-
teenth-century Darwinian view of war as “an inevitable and construc-
tive consequence of the eternal struggle between nations and civiliza-
tions” that had beneficial effects for the combatants (161), including 
social cohesion and group solidarity, commitment to a cause greater 
than the self or family, patriotism, and moral-cultural improve-
ment. . . . [M]any social Darwinists . . . argued that the survival 
of the fittest provides a justification for war [as] a means of social, 
cultural, and moral progress. (161) 
Holsti says some European leaders believed that war prevented nation-
al degeneration caused by industrialization and other technological 
developments that made the social environment less physically demand-
ing (161). Modern life, they claimed, discouraged and even sapped mas-
212 Scl/Élc
culine vigour in a nation’s population, rendering men weaker and less 
able to defend the nation-state when war did come. Many military lead-
ers, then, considered war not as a last resort in international relations, 
but as an actual social good, and they viewed “themselves as the vehicles 
of progress and regeneration” (Holsti 164). 
Some English-Canadian nationalists during the nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries shared this view of war as a nation-building and 
nation-saving exercise, although the Dominion’s colonial status and 
other factors led to some noteworthy differences between their views 
and those of European thinkers. Whereas the major European powers 
had imperial structures already in place, Canada lacked such estab-
lished national institutions and therefore did not quite emerge from 
colony to independent nation-state. Canada was still part of the British 
Empire and its nationalism and approach to war followed only some of 
the patterns scholars have observed elsewhere. In Canada, anglophone 
nationalists generally saw their national identity as being inextricably 
tied both to war and to the identity of the British Empire.
In War and Society in Post-Confederation Canada, Jeffrey A. Keshen 
and Serge Marc Durflinger argue that in the nineteenth century, mod-
ernization — that is, industrialization and urbanization — was as much 
a concern for English-Canadian nationalists as it was for thinkers else-
where: 
this modernization also promoted worry among prominent 
Canadians, particularly Anglo-Saxon community leaders, over 
men succumbing to too soft and too slothful a life. . . . “manly” 
qualities, such as physical strength, prowess, courage, duty, and 
honour, would be honed through military service and participation 
in imperial adventures. Imperialists also believed closer imperial 
defence arrangements would better enable Canada to protect itself 
against the United States and help spread the benefits of a “superi-
or” Anglo-Saxon society to “lesser” peoples worldwide. (31) 
Mark Moss writes, “The unhealthy living conditions in cities were 
seen as contributing to the decline of manly virtues” (15). The view of 
Canada as the home of a new, young, and northern (and therefore supe-
rior) “race” contributed to the belief that its people would be “natural” 
warriors; as Keshen and Durflinger put it, “the physical and intellectual 
vigour of its ‘northern’ people seemed to preordain a leadership role over 
the ‘greatest Empire ever known to civilization’” (31).
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For example, Samuel Hughes, in his address to Parliament on 
February 2, 1905, said that the establishment of a country-wide militia 
system would instil discipline in boys, defining discipline as “polish, 
education, the development of the spirit of individuality and of liberty; 
it means patriotism and loyalty to your country; it means development 
of the physical; it means manhood” (qtd. in Keshen and Durf linger 
36). The militia, some believed, surpassed even the British Army in 
its ability to inculcate moral and patriotic principles in young men, 
since so many of its members, and especially the officers, came from 
the middle class and therefore were not subject to the supposed lack 
of self-control attributed to aristocrats and members of the working 
class, who constituted, respectively, the officers and enlisted men in 
the British military (O’Brien 120, 124). James L. Hughes asserted that 
military training offered “greater strength, greater agility, more activ-
ity . . . a better poise, a better bearing,” and so on (qtd. in Keshen and 
Durflinger 38). The benefits of militia training for the country and its 
people, he claimed, would be immense, reinforcing qualities of obedi-
ence and respect (38). O’Brien’s study of the militia system in Ontario 
describes the extent to which it sought to promote national and impe-
rial loyalty, although it primarily served to reinforce certain concepts 
of masculinity (119-21).4 
Thus, a combination of imperialism, nationalism, and Darwinism 
inspired the belief that wars were inevitable, necessary, and beneficial 
for the countries that fought them, and, indeed, for the human race as 
a whole. The British army, more specifically, was seen as a crusading 
force enriching the national character and bringing Christian truth to 
the heathen lesser races (Paris 15). The soldier was held up to be the 
epitome of masculinity, and when his physical strength and courage 
were combined with chivalric values — as each nation assumed was 
the case with its own soldiers — he was the ultimate hero and supreme 
role model for the nation’s youth (Norris 17). In Canada, the militia, 
the cadet system, and, indeed, war itself were seen as institutions that 
benefited the country and its people, contributing to personal develop-
ment and loyalty to King and country (Fisher 16-18). War made a boy 
a man, and a population a nation. 
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Canadian Future-War Fiction: The Context and Tropes
These notions about the benefits of war for nations and their citizens 
found their way into the speculative fiction of the late nineteenth and 
early twentieth centuries, including Canadian texts. As Clarke demon-
strates in his Voices Prophesying War (1966) and his later study, “Future-
War Fiction” (1997), from 1871 to the First World War, hundreds of 
fictional works about future wars appeared in Europe and the United 
States (see Voices chapters 2-4). Clarke argues that these texts arose out 
of the views discussed above: that wars were a normal, acceptable, and 
even beneficial part of international relations in Europe — an opinion 
that could be maintained more easily before the advent of total war 
(see esp. Voices 2, 77)5 — and that war was a nation-building exercise, 
leading to the creation, preservation, and strengthening of nation-states 
(Voices 127). The subgenre also grew out of the evolutionary thinking 
of the period that led authors to write about the future and to engage 
in political, scientific, and technological extrapolation, as well as to see 
countries engaged in a kind of international “survival of the fittest” 
(Voices 132-33; see also Paris 8). American future-war stories reflected 
the emergence of the United States as an imperial power, especially in 
the 1890s (Franklin, War Stars 20-22; see also “How America’s Fictions” 
34). Many authors, like their contemporaries among political and mili-
tary thinkers and leaders, believed war connected present-day citizens 
to their heroic national heritage — consider the martial character of Sir 
Walter Scott’s historical romances — and acted as a corrective to racial 
degeneration and decadence (Paris 45-46). 
Future-war fiction reflects current events as well as the assumption 
that wars would continue to be fought as they had been since time 
immemorial; as David Seed writes in his introduction to Future Wars, 
“The history of future-war fiction . . . becomes an account of the fears 
and expectations of a given historical moment” (2). Clarke shows in 
detail how political developments became mirrored in early future-war 
fiction; depending on circumstances, for example, the enemy du jour 
in Britain could be the French, Russians, Chinese, Mongolians, and 
— finally and for good — the Germans (Voices passim; “Future-War 
Fiction” 10). Authors depicted future wars for various reasons, in par-
ticular to stimulate nationalist sentiment (Voices 64, 122), to encour-
age knowledge of and interest in all things military among boys (Paris 
49-82), and above all to warn of the dangers posed by possible foes. 
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Stories of national defeat were designed to provoke readers and politi-
cians to work toward improving the country’s military, through either 
more spending and/or better organization. The message of such texts 
was “Be prepared”; as Clarke puts it, “the whole aim was either to terrify 
the reader by a clear and merciless demonstration of the consequences 
to be expected from a country’s shortcomings, or to prove the rightness 
of national policy by describing the course of a victorious war in the 
near future” (Voices 38).
These stories and novels were therefore propaganda pieces with a 
markedly nationalist, imperialist, and militarist agenda; technologi-
cal innovations were of less interest than political questions. Thus, the 
nation more than any of the characters is the true protagonist of an early 
future-war text. Echevarria notes that the authors seldom did a good 
job of predicting what a future war would actually be like, and were not 
terribly interested in doing so. Instead, “they sought to persuade their 
readers to accept a specific argument; so, the future . . . was a means 
rather than an end” (xv). Also, these texts created what Graham Dawson 
calls the “pleasure culture of war”: a sense of war as offering entertain-
ment and aesthetic pleasure. Future-war fiction was part of a general 
vogue for war stories of all types, from H.A. Henty’s adventure stories 
to H.G. Wells’s account of nuclear war in The World Set Free (1914). 
Clarke claims that future-war tales were produced only in powerful 
countries (Voices 44), but in Canada, too, a number of works appeared 
in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries dramatizing future 
military conflicts. As was the case elsewhere, the purpose of such texts 
was as much political as literary; during the decades immediately after 
Confederation, authors like Lawrence, Centennius, and Barthe sought 
to reinforce Canadians’ national and imperial sentiments or warn of the 
consequences of complacency in the face of military threats. At first, 
the main source of danger, and therefore the most common antagonist, 
was the United States; “The Dominion in 1983” and The Storm of ’92 
portray attempted or actual invasions of Canada by the Americans. 
Later, however, as Germany became the focus of speculation and then 
the enemy during the First World War, Canadian texts understandably 
shifted their own views, and so in Similia similibus, written during the 
war, the Germans are the invaders of Canada.
Certain specific tropes pervade the genre, and it is clear that in 
many of their details the Canadian texts were strongly inf luenced 
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by future-war stories published elsewhere. Despite the geographical 
proximity of the United States, Canadian future-war fiction appears 
to have been inf luenced far more by British and continental models 
than by American ones. Perhaps the most inf luential of all, and the 
one largely responsible for the outpouring and popularity of future-war 
stories during the period before the First World War, was Sir George 
Tomkyns Chesney’s “The Battle of Dorking” (1871), about a success-
ful German invasion of Great Britain. Chesney’s novella established 
many of the genre’s conventions; on the other hand, while Canadian 
stories follow those conventions, they also show marked differences. 
For instance, Canada has never been a world power, and so it is por-
trayed in Canadian future-war fiction as a marginal player in the power 
games of far bigger countries — in other words, as just one battleground 
in much larger conf licts. Canada is never a provoker of wars, but is 
always a victim of the geopolitical machinations and manoeuvrings of 
stronger countries. In Lawrence’s The Storm of ’92, for example, the 
Americans are pushed to invade Canada because of a hatred for Britain, 
not on the part of the “better” classes but of the “scum of Europe . . . 
in whose mind national honour was an incomprehensible idea” (8-9). 
When Britain and the United States declare war on one another, Canada 
becomes the front line and is therefore directly affected by international 
issues over which it has no control.
As Clarke shows (see Voices chapter 2), a future-war story of the 
period is typically set in the very near future and portrays an unpro-
voked invasion by an enemy — tropes that are certainly present in the 
Canadian tales. In “The Dominion in 1983,” the American plans to 
invade Canada take shape in 1887, only four years from the author’s 
present, while the invasion in The Storm of ’92 occurs a mere three 
years in the future. Also, a future-war tale of that period is commonly 
narrated by a veteran of the war, who may be telling the story to his 
grandchildren, as is the case with “The Battle of Dorking.” The sub-
title of Lawrence’s text is A Grandfather’s Tale Told in 1932; just as in 
Chesney’s story, a veteran recounts the origins and progress of the war 
to his grandson. 
The Storm of ’92 is the text that most clearly reflects Chesney’s influ-
ence, and much of the following analysis will focus on it. Lawrence’s 
novella is almost certainly a response to an American story, Samuel 
Barton’s The Battle of the Swash and the Capture of Canada (1888); 
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in fact, there are some clear parallels between the two that may sug-
gest direct inspiration if not imitation on Lawrence’s part.6 For exam-
ple, both are narrated forty years after the events portrayed. Also, as 
noted above, future-war fiction is nearly always inspired by current 
crises, and the lingering dispute over the east- and west-coast fisheries 
between Britain and the United States during the 1880s is presented as 
a major source of friction in both stories (see Barton 39-48). Indeed, in 
Lawrence’s tale, the war’s trigger is a confrontation between a Canadian 
cruiser and an American fishing vessel, the Blaine (13, 16-20).7 
That the story is a cautionary tale becomes clear in one character’s 
account of the war’s causes. The narrator’s friend, Waller, speaks at 
length about Britain’s preference for free trade over imperial preference 
and her refusal to pay attention when annexationist sentiments rose in 
the United States, asking, “‘Why was England so blind?’” (44). On the 
other hand, unlike Chesney and other authors who sought to warn their 
people about a lack of preparedness caused by short-sighted military 
leaders, Lawrence presents his officers positively, particularly the nar-
rator’s general, “who had fought England’s battles in three continents 
already. . . . He looked as jaunty and self-possessed as though passing 
down Whitehall” (49).
One of Lawrence’s major themes is unity, both national and impe-
rial. Thus, the narrator tells us early on that Canada’s successful defence 
against an American invasion resulted from its statesmen’s willingness 
to set aside their factional differences: “they forgot party bickerings and 
thought only of their country” (8). Canada benefited from being part 
of a benign empire: “Our people were loyal to that just power whose 
yoke was no heavier than a garland of roses, whose gentle sway we were 
proud to own” (9).8 Ideological differences play a key role in the con-
flict. Americans had long sought to spread their democracy to Canada, 
but that very democracy is what incites Canadian resistance to annexa-
tion: “we feared the result of democratic government where the reins of 
power had fallen from the hands of the educated, to be grasped by the 
ignorant, the worthless and the base” (10). 
A common trope in future-war tales is the drawing of a sharp con-
trast between the period of peace before hostilities begin and the storm 
that later erupts. Like Chesney and others, Lawrence sets up a recurring 
contrast between the peaceful life before the invasion and the turmoil 
and violence of war. The narrator describes his tranquil Toronto street 
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before the war (23), and the quiet night before the battle as the narrator 
contemplates the stars and his surroundings (40). 
In North American future-war stories, Irish or other immigrants 
who import “strange” ideas (anarchism, socialism, etc.) and fifth col-
umnists foment the war. In Lawrence’s story, American politicians curry 
favour with Irish-American voters by taking a belligerent stand over the 
Blaine incident. Helping the American cause are “pestilent little gnats” 
— annexationist politicians — and “disloyal newspapers published in 
our own country” (13). Accounts of severed intercontinental and inter-
provincial communication lines reflect a distinctly Canadian feature of 
the conflict: the vastness of the country and the challenge of maintain-
ing transportation and communication links among its parts and with 
the imperial centre (29-30). Pro-annexationist saboteurs are suspected 
or found to be responsible for causing the damage and are lynched (30). 
The enemy in future-war fiction is usually depicted as remorseless, 
cunning, and fully prepared for battle, attacking the homeland with as 
much certainty of purpose as skill (see, for example, the depiction of the 
French in Horace Francis Lester’s “The Taking of Dover” [1888] and 
the British in “The Stricken Nation” [1890]); the invaded country’s own 
soldiers, meanwhile, are brave and virtuous. But in Lawrence’s story, the 
invading Americans are portrayed as half-hearted combatants, owing to 
the reluctance of the “better class” of politicians and journalists to fight 
and the close economic ties between the United States and Canada (31). 
More importantly, the Americans, Canadians, and British share a racial 
heritage that makes any struggle between them “a civil and fratricidal 
war” (31).9 This nuanced view of the invaders represents a marked differ-
ence between the Canadian and other examples of the genre. Another is 
the especially important role that the militia plays in Canada’s defence, 
reflecting the ideas about the value of the Canadian militia discussed 
earlier. Lawrence presents scenes of men joining the “city volunteer regi-
ments” of Toronto (26); in fact, the narrator says, “although no bounties 
were offered, or impressment system adopted by Parliament, I believe 
almost every man of suitable age belonged to some corps or other” (30). 
Other elements of Lawrence’s tale are more conventional. The con-
cern among British authors that city life was causing the degeneration of 
the British race and its ability to fight wars (see above) is reflected here, 
the narrator commenting that “most of our men were city bred, and 
were pretty well fagged out by the heat, dust, excitement and march-
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ing of the day” (39). A stock character in future-war fiction is the son 
of a famous officer now making his own mark in the military, thereby 
representing the continuation of the nation’s military heritage. In The 
Storm of ’92, that character is Lieutenant Elliott; he is the son of an 
honoured officer and engaged to the narrator’s daughter, and thus heir 
to the British military tradition. The progress of the war is very much in 
line with the events depicted in European, particularly British, stories. 
In the latter, the outcome of the war is often determined by the fate 
of the Royal Navy; British defeat inevitably results when the navy is 
neutralized, as in “The Battle of Dorking.” Here, the fleet arrives and 
bombards New York, then lands British and imperial troops on both 
coasts (32). The arrival of those soldiers boosts morale; as the narrator 
says, “The idea that we would fight side by side with the historic regi-
ments of the Imperial army made the younger men almost exult that 
war had come” (33). 
The narrator’s unit moves down to Niagara and fights a second 
Battle of Queenston Heights in the shadow of Brock’s Monument (46). 
The real Battle of Queenston Heights, waged during the War of 1812, 
had achieved mythic status among nationalists as a “glorious” victory 
over the invading Americans, rendered even more meaningful by the 
death of the British commander, Sir Isaac Brock, during the battle. 
Lawrence’s allusions to the battle and Brock are a clear example of the 
way propagandists use commemoration of the nation’s military history, 
and especially of “blood sacrifice,” to promote nationalist sentiment. 
The narrator says,
For the first time in eighty years a Canadian army was crossing that 
old field in the footsteps of those led by the gallant Brock upon his 
last march, and towards the spot where he found his grave; and, 
while upon our left the ruined and grass-grown mounds, which 
marked the site of Fort George, in his day a powerful earthwork, 
bore testimony to the lapse of time, I do not believe that the senti-
ments of patriotism which inspired his men, burned less warmly in 
the breasts of this army of a later day. (51)
Another allusion to Canadian military history is the reference to Irish-
Americans as being among the first enemy soldiers encountered, recall-
ing the Fenian raids (46). Thus, the story hearkens back to Canada’s 
own military heritage as much as Britain’s.
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As is so often the case in such tales, the future battle looks very 
much like one from the past, with infantry using linear tactics, even 
in an era of rifles and Gatling guns (53-61). The narrator’s unit (along 
with Brock’s Monument) is saved by the Black Watch (57), one of the 
Empire’s best-known and most storied regiments. Later, the narrator 
is knocked unconscious when a makeshift hospital he visits is shelled, 
and when he regains consciousness, he learns that the tide of the war 
was turned, and the country saved, when imperial troops from all over 
the world joined the fight at last. British ironclads proved too powerful 
for the American ships. The United States was no match for the united 
Empire and its navy (63).
Lawrence’s nationalist agenda is clear throughout the tale. Early in 
the text is a line that will remind modern readers of the myth of Vimy 
Ridge: the war, the narrator says, “made Canada what she is today” 
(5). Indeed, he begins his account of “how we became a nation” with 
Confederation but makes it clear that the political act was only the first, 
and not necessarily the most important, step (6). Later, on the eve of the 
battle, he thinks about 
the fate of this little nation which had drawn the sword against the 
mighty power of its attacking enemy. What had the coming years 
in store? Were we, with all our pride in Canada, with all our affec-
tion for the land of our fathers and our wish to remain part of its 
Empire, to become another Poland — conquered, disgraced? Was 
it already Fate’s decree that we should witness our flag torn down, 
beaten back and banished from this continent, that we should live 
to listen with burning cheeks to the scarce-concealed sneers of our 
conquerors? Or would the fire and endurance of a race enured to 
danger bring us in safety through this trial. (41) 
The passage is a nationalist and imperialist cry designed to stir those 
same passions in the reader. Waller expresses a familiar sentiment — 
war as a nation-building, and therefore positive, exercise:
“I believe this war in the inscrutable providence of the Almighty 
is for the best, and though it may seem cruel that it will desolate 
many homes and put many a poor fellow under the sod, it is yet for 
the best, because it is permitted to be. Is mere life — even human 
life — of such paramount value, that there is nothing to be desired 
by men in comparison with it? . . . The war will build up Canada. 
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There is no bond between human hearts like that brought about 
by a common danger and a common grief — and our Provinces, 
but lately such strangers to one another, now face the one, and will 
shortly, God help us, share the other. So with ourselves, England 
and the Empire.” (42)
Peace finally comes when an “influential peace party of both nations, 
moved by the terrible injuries the two branches of the English speaking 
race were inflicting on each other, were successful in bringing about a 
cessation of hostilities” (66); thus, racial kinship overrides economic, 
political, and national differences. Canada has demonstrated that the 
twentieth century does indeed belong to it: “There is peace to-day in 
Canada, and happiness among her twenty millions of prosperous people, 
forming the new nation of the Western world. Knit together as one 
nation, old differences silenced and forgotten, we have become heirs to a 
goodly heritage” (69). More importantly, thanks to the war, Canada has 
become a nation able to stand alongside its imperial brothers with pride:
Not in vain, in the fresh morning of their young life did these 
first-born of our nation’s heroes pass into darkness. Still over them, 
upon that tall staff, f loats the f lag for love of which they died. 
Here in this sacred spot, let us resolve that Canada, preserved by 
their sacrifice, shall be a nation great, just and renowned; great in 
the great hearts, the high aims, the noble courage of her people; 
progressing ever onward in all that is worthy, beneficent and good, 
until nation shall no longer rise against nation, and men shall learn 
war no more. (71)
Canada’s nationhood is forged in the fires of war, and Canada has 
emerged triumphant and prosperous, thanks to Providence and the 
Royal Navy.
In “The Dominion in 1983,” war is mentioned more brief ly as a 
contributing factor in Canada’s national development. The narrator is 
a Canadian living in 1983 and looking back at the past century of the 
nation’s history. Once again, Canada faces a possible invasion by the 
Americans because the United States is too welcoming of immigrants: 
“The Americans for years had been too careless about receiving upon 
their shores all the firebrands and irreconcileables from European cit-
ies, and the consequence was that these undesirable gentry increased in 
numbers, and the infection of their opinions spread” (298). America’s 
wealth leads to corruption in its politics and inspires annexationist senti-
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ments among the greedier and more envious Canadians (298-99). Also, 
Americans believe it is “their duty to mankind . . . to convert all the 
world — by force if necessary — to republican principles” (299). 
The immediate trigger for the attempted invasion is a series of eco-
nomic crises that lead to revolutions and wars in Europe; as a result, 
British military might is needed at home to defend the mother country. 
Poor harvests and economic turmoil produce a similar crisis in North 
America (299-300), while annexationists in Canada led by Reformers, 
and Fenians in the United States influenced similarly by “politicians of 
a low order” (300), threaten Canada’s sovereignty. Canadians from one 
end of the country to the other — even Quebecers and Manitobans, 
despite the presence of many Irishmen in Manitoba — rally to the 
nation’s defence (300-01). Canadians living in the United States, now 
disillusioned with republicanism, also return ready to defend their 
homeland (300).
Various disasters in the United States, including the assassination 
of the president, delay an invasion. Even nature, acting on behalf of 
Providence, thwarts the American plans, as storms detain an invasion 
force gathered in San Francisco harbour (301). Meanwhile, the British 
Empire adds new territories and friends, gaining a degree of power and 
prestige no foe would dare challenge. Once again, events outside of 
Canada or its control determine its fate in the face of war. As in The 
Storm of ’92, the threat of invasion brings an end to political and sec-
tional strife at home: “Henceforth there was but one party with but 
one object in view — the welfare of the Dominion” (303). When Great 
Britain feels secure enough, it sends 12,000 soldiers, and the American 
government arrests the invasion plotters. While war is averted, the sig-
nificance of the crisis lies in how the threat has fostered the growth of 
Canadian nationalism:
Of course the benefit to Canada of having had the national feel-
ing so deeply stirred was incalculable, for all classes of men in all 
the provinces had been animated by the profoundest sentiments 
and the strongest determination possible, and it was the opinion of 
leading military men of the time that the Canadians under arms, 
though outnumbered trebly by the intending invaders, would have 
held their own gallantly and have come off victorious. (303)
Later, during the twentieth century, a world war breaks out, but that 
conflict is also conveniently negated by random events. 
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In some European future-war stories, and many American ones, 
authors speculate that new weapons might be developed that are so 
terrible civilized nations would refrain from using them. That predic-
tion appears in Centennius’s tale: “war has ceased all the world over. 
It became, at last, too destructive to be indulged in at all” (311). The 
last great war occurs in 1932, but it is quickly ended when “a monster 
oxyhydrogen shell” (Centennius does not explain this weapon) kills the 
combatants’ leaders. War is now impossible because the “armies hardly 
had a chance of getting near each other, so fearful was the execution of 
the shells. Since then, the world has been free from war, and, but for 
gathering clouds in Asia, would seem likely to remain so” (311). While 
Northern Europeans are too civilized to embark on a war, the same can-
not be said of militaristic “lesser races” like those in the southern part 
of the continent, and the “Sclavs,” we are told, have become the great-
est threat to world peace (312-13). Meanwhile, thanks to their national 
evolution, the Americans are now too advanced a people to attempt 
another invasion; “even if Americans coveted our possessions they are 
not likely to resort to such an old-fashioned expedient as warfare to gain 
them” (311-12).
Ulric Barthe’s Similia similibus was published during, and is an alter-
native history of, the First World War; in Barthe’s version, the war does 
not begin until the Germans attack North America. Cast as a dream 
vision, the tale concerns a successful German invasion of Québec. Once 
more, fifth columnists play a prominent role in what happens, as the 
Germans are able to move artillery and troops into the province due to 
some foolish farmers who, a decade before the war, sold their land to 
Germans pretending to be innocent immigrants. Indeed, we can read 
the novel in the context of the roman de la terre, a form expressing the 
conservative nationalist view that the survival of the French Canadians 
is intimately tied to continued possession of, and work on, the land. 
In any case, like the “enemy aliens” who assist foreign forces to invade 
England in many stories during the 1880s and 1890s, these Germans 
immigrate solely to facilitate a takeover, a detail ref lecting the xeno-
phobia often seen in this sort of fiction (Clarke, Voices 63). Throughout 
Canada, moreover, secret anarchist German associations try unsuccess-
fully to help the German invaders expand their conquest.
Tropes discussed earlier appear throughout, such as the depiction of 
the peaceful world before disaster strikes, in this case a pleasant evening 
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just before the Germans bombard Québec: “Cette petite scène intime 
se passait par une belle soirée d’été dans un de ces calmes intérieurs, 
employons plutot le mot du terroir, dans une de ces ‘maisons d’habi-
tants’ à l’aise qui bordent la rive gauche du fleuve Saint-Laurent” (19-
20). Friends and family have gathered to celebrate the engagement of 
Paul Belmond and Marie-Anne Meunier, but the party is halted by a 
powerful explosion; thus, once again, an upcoming marriage is horribly 
interrupted by the enemy attack. Because the invaders are members of 
the German “race,” they display their barbarity and moral turpitude 
by committing atrocities against the people they have conquered (182-
91). The Germans, especially the novel’s chief villain, Biebenheim, are 
stereotypical Prussians: thickset, militaristic, and arrogant. General 
von Goelinger tells the Québec premier, “Moi, je vous demanderai tout 
simplement de voir dans ce fait stupéfiant la demonstration de la force 
irresistible, surhumaîne, de la Kulture allemande. Avec nous, vouloir 
c’est pouvoir” (92). He further declares, revealingly, “La guerre est l’une 
de nos industries nationales.” Biebenheim has designs on Marie-Anne, 
and, when he sees his supposed romantic rival on the street not long 
after the capture of Québec, he tries to shoot Paul, having no com-
punction about firing his pistol into a crowd of civilians. Paul ducks, 
but the bullet strikes and kills a mother holding her baby (59). At that 
point, someone cries out, “Ce ne sont pas des Allemands, ce sont des 
Sauvages!” (59). 
Indeed, since Barthe’s text is intended as propaganda to inspire sup-
port for the war effort, it is full of anti-German racism (80-81, 92); for 
example, we are told that “Le pillage . . . ils ont cela dans le sang” and 
“Ce sont encore des barbares” (150). Barthe’s story, like Lawrence’s, 
draws parallels to historical events: in this case, the Germans’ march 
through Québec City and their ensuing proclamation (61-69) recall the 
British Conquest of 1759-60. Collaborators are said to have helped “à 
la troisième prise de Québec. Depuis plus de cent cinquante ans, pareil 
événement ne s’était pas vue” (61). The Germans, like the Americans 
in 1812, assume the French Canadians will welcome them as liberators 
from British rule (90). Some villagers are complacent, feeling the prov-
ince is simply being passed from one colonial master to another, but 
most resist, enthusiastically joining the anti-German forces. The most 
direct parallels Barthe draws, however, are between what happens in 
Québec and what had, supposedly, happened to the Belgians and French 
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in Europe. Biebenheim’s Proclamation, for example, is identical to the 
one the Germans issued in Lunéville, France, in August 1914 (69 n. 1). 
In fact, the title refers to that parallel, as Jimmy says in the epilogue: 
Une chose certain, c’est que ce qui est arrivé à la Belgique pourrait 
bien nous arriver, à nous aussi, si par malheur la digue qui retient 
le torrent prussien, de la Mer du Nord à la frontier Suisse, allait se 
briser faute de bras pour le soutenir. Similia similibus, comme vous 
dites en latin, monsieur le curé. (242)
What happened there not only could but also inevitably would happen 
here, if the Québécois people remained unprepared. Paul recounts his 
dream vision to his visitors, and is urged by one of them to turn his 
vision into a book. He says, “Si cela pouvait nous tirer de notre lethar-
gie! Il y a encore tant d’indifférents qui s’imaginent suprimer les fléaux 
en se bouchant les yeux et les oreilles, en se renfermant dans leur étroit 
égoïsme!” (241). 
Like the other texts I have discussed, Similia similibus offers a 
nationalist message: the benefits of war in uniting the country and 
providing a foundation for its growth and development. Here, the unity 
involves the two founding races, represented by the journalists Paul 
Belmont and Jimmy Smythe. Despite a brief disagreement over the races 
in Canada and their qualities (209-11), they work together to subvert 
the Germans. As we learn, “Un feu nouveau sembla couler dans leur 
veines avec le bon vieux sang gaulois et celtique dont les plus nobles 
races du Vieux Monde ont fécondé le sol de la Jeune Amérique” (63) 
and “Jamais le sentiment de solidarité nationale ne s’était aussi sponta-
nément imposé à tous les esprits” (201). At this point, the “solidarité” 
refers only to that of the French Canadians, but as the novel progresses, 
it is clear that Barthe is talking about the whole country’s unity. Only 
by working together and overcoming their differences can French and 
English Canadians prevent Paul’s drug-induced nightmare from coming 
true. Barthe’s novel is about not so much a future war as a future battle; 
he predicts that the First World War could come to Canada’s shores if 
people are not very careful. 
Like authors in Great Britain and the United States, then, Canadian 
writers found the portrayal of imaginary wars to be a dramatic and 
effective means by which to rouse their readers’ patriotism and stoke 
their fears, presenting the dangers that the country faced while at the 
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same time reassuring their audience that united effort and prudent poli-
cies would lead to inevitable victory. In that sense, military themes in 
early Canadian speculative fiction are very much part of a more general 
trend — the rise of the future-war story — but with key differences 
shaped by local political factors, evidenced in the nature of the enemy 
depicted and the manner in which that enemy would need to be fought. 
At the same time, the works served a purpose that many critics have 
detected in the fiction, drama, and poetry of the period: not just the 
expression but, in fact, the creation of a national identity (see Coleman 
36-37). These tales of imaginary wars were part of that process, as they 
featured voices prophesying war with a distinctly Canadian accent. 
Notes
1 As Pierre Berton writes in Vimy, “It has become commonplace to say that Canada 
came of age at Vimy Ridge” (294), and he describes the spread of what he calls “Vimy fever” 
in the aftermath of the war (295). Similarly, in his introduction to We Wasn’t Pals, Bruce 
Meyer observes that “Vimy is always cited as the apotheosis of Canadian participation in 
the First World War” (xxii). See McKay and Swift for a discussion of the myth and reality 
of the battle (65-79). 
2 Narratives of relatively peaceful future Canadas from the period include Jules-Paul 
Tardivel’s Pour la patrie (1895), John Galbraith’s In the New Capital (1897), Frederick 
Nelson’s Toronto in 1928 A.D. (1908), and Hugh Pedley’s Looking Forward (1913). It should 
be noted, however, that boys in Galbraith’s twentieth-century Canada are given cadet train-
ing and that the narrator is told that “in the time of danger or peril to our country, every 
man, old and young, is a drilled soldier, with the glorious motto in his patriotic bosom: 
‘Death before retreat!’” (124). 
3 See also Ubald Paquin’s La cité dans les fers (1925) about the violent suppression of 
Québec’s bid for independence by Canadian and Imperial troops.
4 See also Baetz 10, and, on the continuing view of war as a nation-building exercise 
after the First World War, Vance, Death So Noble, especially 10-11.
5 On the tropes and forms of realist war fiction written during and after World War I, 
see Fussell and Cobley.
6 Some of the story’s dialogue suggests that the narrator’s name is William Lawrence. 
Since we know nothing about W.H.C. Lawrence, the presumed author, it is possible that 
the name on the cover belongs to the narrator rather than the author, who would then be 
anonymous. That is pure speculation, however, so, for the sake of clarity, I use “Lawrence” 
to refer to the author and “the narrator” to refer to the narrator.
7 For much of the nineteenth century, Great Britain and the United States disagreed 
over the rights of American fishermen to fish in Canadian waters. The two sides, with some 
Canadian participation, attempted to settle the dispute with the Treaty of Washington 
(1871). When the fisheries provisions of that treaty terminated in 1885, the Canadian gov-
ernment asserted its sovereignty over Canadian waters and even seized an American ship 
in 1887. A new fisheries treaty was negotiated in 1887 but not ratified by the Republican-
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dominated Congress; however, an administrative agreement involving Canadian licensing 
of American vessels was finally reached the following year. The Blaine is named after James 
G. Blaine, secretary of state under newly elected (1888) Republican president Benjamin 
Harrison; Blaine was supported by Irish-American voters and was quite anti-Britain.
It is worth noting that the same dispute is the spark for the war depicted in American 
author Hugh Gratton Donnelly’s “The Stricken Nation” (1890). In Donnelly’s story, 
Canada becomes a powerful staging ground for the British Navy and thereby contributes 
greatly to Britain’s wanton destruction of American coastal cities. The image of Canada as 
a serious military threat to the United States contrasts starkly with the self-image we see 
in the Canadian texts.
8 By contrast, in Barton’s novella, after a brief war, Britain happily surrenders Canada, 
which it considers an imperial burden, in order to secure a peace treaty with the United 
States. Also, Barton’s tale includes examples of new weapons, the products of “Yankee 
ingenuity,” that are a distinctive feature of American future-war fiction.
9 Barton is at pains to point out in his preface to the Canadian edition of his novella 
that he harbours no ill feelings toward Great Britain or Canada; he is seeking only to 
provoke his countrymen into rebuilding and renewing their merchant marine and navy 
(iv-v). As he says, it is
his earnest hope that the commercial and political union of the English-speaking peo-
ples of the North American Continent, which he believes to be inevitable in the not 
distant future, may be accomplished — not by war, nor by force, but by the united and 
intelligent popular sentiment of two great communities, whose territories are contigu-
ous, whose language is the same, whose institutions are similar, and whose interests 
are — or should be — identical. (v)
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